tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-213049692007-09-25T04:46:20.950-07:00BAKER CHIROPRACTIC OFFICE - DR. JOHN RAYMOND BAKER, D.C.- A DOCTOR IN TEXASchiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comBlogger84125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-38827998254669822472007-09-25T04:45:00.000-07:002007-09-25T04:46:20.981-07:00JOB OPENING IN LONGVIEW TEXAS<span style=";font-family:verdana;font-size:180%;" ><span style="font-weight: bold;">BAKER CHIROPRACTIC, PA , one of the friendliest Doctor's offices in Longview, has a position available right now for the right applicant. For details, please click</span><br /><a style="font-weight: bold;" href="http://positionavailable.blogspot.com/">http://positionavailable.blogspot.com </a><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">If you are interested in getting into health care in a ground level position, contact Baker Chiropractic about this job opening.</span></span>chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-71187186814956731442007-06-14T22:42:00.001-07:002007-06-14T22:42:58.900-07:00repeal of treatment planning rule<<a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="mailto:MedicalBenefits@tdi.state.tx.us" _fcksavedurl="mailto:MedicalBenefits@tdi.state.tx.us">MedicalBenefits@tdi.state.tx.us</a>> 6/13/2007 7:15 PM >>>The Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation has announced that repeals of two workers' compensation rules will be submitted to the Texas Register. The rules are the Prospective Review of Medical Care Not Requiring Preauthorization (PRM) rule and the Treatment Planning rule.The PRM rule is no longer needed due to the adoption of treatment guidelines for the workers' compensation system. To view the news release concerning PRM, please click on the following link: <a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/news/2007/news200776.html" target="_blank" _fcksavedurl="http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/news/2007/news200776.html">http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/news/2007/news200776.html</a> .The treatment planning rule was adopted last December as one of several disability management rules but the effective date was postponed due to concerns expressed by system participants. The repeal of the treatment planning rule will not affect the other disability management rules including those adopting treatment and return-to-work guidelines for Texas. To view the news release concerning treatment planning, please click on the following link:<br /><a onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)" href="http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/news/2007/news200779.html" target="_blank" _fcksavedurl="http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/news/2007/news200779.html">http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/news/2007/news200779.html</a> ."June 12, 2007<br />TDI Will Change Disability Management Requirements<br />FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEJune 12, 2007News Release<br />FOR MORE INFORMATIONJohn Greeley @ (512) 804-4202<br />Austin, TX – The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) announced that a workers’ compensation rule to require treatment planning for injured employees (28 Texas Administrative Code §137.300) will be repealed. This rule was adopted along with other disability management rules in December, 2006. The effective date for treatment planning was postponed until September 1, 2007, however, as the agency attempted to address ongoing concerns from system participants.<br />A repeal of the treatment planning rule will be submitted to the Texas Register. Since the rule has not become effective, system participants will not be required to meet the rule’s requirements.<br />“System participants support the concept of treatment planning, but many also agree that implementation will require significant business and administrative process changes,” Commissioner of Workers’ Compensation Albert Betts said. “We were concerned that participants would not be able to initiate treatment planning without some lapses in care for injured employees.”<br />Dr. Howard Smith, Medical Advisor for TDI’s Division of Workers’ Compensation, said TDI plans to work with health care providers and insurance carriers on a treatment planning pilot program. <br />“This treatment planning pilot will allow us to identify opportunities for improved communication and efficient delivery of appropriate medical care,” Smith said.<br />Since publication of the adopted disability management rules, system participants expressed the need for additional time to establish processes to appropriately address required treatment planning. Participants also argued for additional time to communicate and develop treatment planning parameters that are mutually acceptable to health care providers and insurance carriers.<br />Disability management rules requiring the use of workers’ compensation treatment guidelines and return-to-work guidelines became effective May 1, 2007 and will remain in effect."chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-27016156739171318002007-06-13T11:25:00.000-07:002007-06-13T11:28:43.873-07:00BAKER CHIROPRACTIC,PA - NOW ON TEXAS TRUE CHOICEBaker Chiropractic,PA is now on the list of providers for Texas True Choice Insurance, which is the health insurance covering city workers in Longview Texas.<br /><br />So, if you are on Texas True Choice and need Chiropractic, please call 903-753-5400 to make an appointment to come in for an examination.<br /><br />Thanks for visiting our site.chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-64633917590599011272007-05-16T04:32:00.000-07:002007-05-16T04:33:09.422-07:00SOMBRA , BIOFREEZE, TENS UNITSBaker Chiropractic, PA not only is the place for excellent care in Longview Texas, but we also carry a line of products to ease your muscle spasm and pain.<br /><br />We carry Sombra, a pepper based liniment which offers warm relief to pain.<br /><br />We also carry soothing, cool biofreeze, the green gel that soothes those tense muscles.<br /><br />We also carry Transcutaneous Electrical Muscle Stimulators for those patients treated at Baker Chiropractic who may need an alternative pain management method.<br /><br />And last but certainly not least, we carry the fine therapeutic line of pillows from Mellow Out Spa , Inc.<br /><br />Please come in at 1420 McCann St., Longview Texas, in the Brookwood Shopping Village, or call us at 903-753-5400.chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-62868436417326295602007-03-18T19:37:00.000-07:002007-03-18T19:38:14.589-07:00http://bakerchiro.sprinterweb.net<a href="http://bakerchiro.sprinterweb.net">http://bakerchiro.sprinterweb.net</a>chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-24079062035713397022007-03-12T11:24:00.000-07:002007-03-12T11:26:11.125-07:00Biological Basis For Teenage Mood Swings FoundFrom <a href="http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/healthnews.php?newsid=65035">http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/healthnews.php?newsid=65035</a><br /><br />A new US study has revealed that teenage mood swings may be explained by biological changes in the adolescent brain.<br /><br /> The research is published in the journal <i>Nature Neuroscience</i>.<br /><br /> Mood swings and anxiety, often caused by stress, are well known characteristics of puberty.<br /><br />A physiologist at the State University of New York, Sheryl Smith, and her research colleagues experimented on female adolescent mice and showed that their brains respond to stress in a different way to adults and pre-pubescent individuals.<br /><br />Anxiety is regulated by the brains's principal inhibitory neurotransmitter, GABA (gamma-amino-butyric-acid) which counteracts the effect of glutamate, an excitatory neurotransmitter in the brain's limbic system.<br /><br />Stress causes the release of a steroid known as THP (allopregnanolone) which in adult and pre-pubescent individuals increases the "calming" effect of GABA in the limbic system. However, Smith and her team found that THP had the opposite effect in adolescent mice.<br /><br />It would appear that THP has two roles, one in the limbic system where it helps to calm things down, and another in the hippocampus where in adolescents it hots things up. The hippocampus is important for emotion regulation.<br /><br /> This paradoxical role of THP, said Smith and her team, is the reason for the adolescent brain behaving differently.<br /><br />The underlying mechanism appears to be different levels of expression of a type of receptor known as the "alpha4betadelta" GABAA receptor in the hippocampal brain region known as CA1.<br /><br /> In adults and pre-adolescents, the receptors are in low numbers so the overall effect of THP is a calming one.<br /><br /> However, in adolescents, the expression of these receptors is high, so for these individuals the anxiety raising effect of THP in the hippocampus outweighs the calming effect it has in the limbic system.<br /><br /> Smith and her team were able to reverse the puberty effect in the mice by genetically altering the number of receptors.<br /><br />The net effect is that whatever the teenage person's reaction to stress is likely to be, whether to cry or be angry, it will be "amplified". While to adults it may seem like an overreaction, to the teenager it is the only thing they can do, said the researchers.<br /><br />This study is thought to be the first to suggest an underlying physiological, as opposed to a behavioural-psychological explanation for teenage mood swingchiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-39306236186902973402007-03-10T06:33:00.000-08:002007-03-10T06:47:00.340-08:00TREATED BAD BY INSURANCE CARRIER ?I see injured workers every day. As a treating doctor, daily I am confronted with insurance carriers who deny, dispute, foot drag, and some, act in a way that may constitute "bad faith".<br /><br />Patients get upset. But, how will things get changed? Patients who are unrepresented by attorneys, patients who cannot afford to hire attorneys specializing in Work Comp, but who are advised by ombudsman, often lose Benefits Review Conferences (BRC) and Contested Claims Hearings (CCH), and, after reading the decisions, I believe these folks ought NOT to have lost, because there is a preponderence of medical opinion in their favor.<br /><br />Perhaps you alone cannot change the system, but I contend that if ENOUGH weight is brought to bear on the Department of Insurance about perceived wrongdoing by insurance carriers, and enough media people (television stations, radio, newspapers, bloggers) bring the issue to the public attention, there is certainly a stronger possibility that some positive changes will occur.<br /><br />If no one complains, or not enough complain, the system will get worse and worse and worse.<br /><br />Perhaps the easiest way to contact the Texas Department of Insurance, Work Comp division, is via e-mail <a title="WorkersComp@tdi.state.tx.us" href="mailto:WorkersComp@tdi.state.tx.us">WorkersComp@tdi.state.tx.us</a> .<br /><br />To write a snail mail letter of complaint :<br />Texas Department of Insurance<br />Division of Workers' Compensation<br />7551 Metro Center Drive<br />Suite 100<br />Austin, TX 78744-1609<br />You may also contact the <a title="Division of Workers' Comp Field Offices" href="http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/wc/fieldoffices/focounty.html">Field Office</a> nearest youchiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-37495904488634882142007-03-09T15:00:00.000-08:002007-03-09T16:06:09.038-08:00In probably the only time in history, Dr. John Raymond Baker,DC and the Texas Medical Association are in agreementThere is the old saying about the enemy of my enemy is my friend. I just discovered that I and the TMA are in agreement about something. Both of us agree that Gardasil, also known as the "cervical cancer vaccine" (though that is a misnomer and it is not a vaccine against cervical cancer) should NOT be mandated by the state of Texas.<br /><br />"Earlier this month, Gov. Rick Perry issued an executive order that made Texas the first state to mandate the vaccine for young girls. Perry said his goal was to protect future generations from cervical cancer, which afflicts 10,000 U.S. women a year.<br />Perry has been rebuked by social conservatives, who say his promotion of the vaccine condones pre-marital sex, and legislators who say he exceeded his constitutional powers by issuing the executive order.<br />The Texas Medical Association, too, has said that the vaccine shouldn't be mandated, citing, in part, the high cost of the three-shot regimen, which starts at $360."<br />-<a href="http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/metro/4588270.html">http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/metro/4588270.html</a><br /><br />We must note that, as cited above, the cost of the three shot regimen STARTS at $360.00.<br />Now imagine if, as Gov. Perry would have it, every female child in a certain age range, would be mandated to take the shot. Can you say "millions of dollars for Merck". It just so happens, that the same day Gov Perry signed the executive order mandating the Merck medicine be given to girls...his "campaign" received a "contribution" of $5000.00.<br /><br />Perry says it was just a "coincidence".<br /><br />Yeah, and light hitting the head of my bed just "coincides" with the sun rising.chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-2458237394765452672007-03-09T05:01:00.000-08:002007-03-09T05:02:47.339-08:00Get ready for Spring and SummerWell, the hours in the day are getting longer, the weather is getting warmer, and it won't be long before you will be getting active in the outdoors. If that knee or back or neck is holding you back, isn't it about time you had it seen about and got the kind of treatment to get you back to shape?<br /><br />Call 903-753-5400 today and make an appointment with Dr. John Raymond Baker,DC .chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-19446734070255331702007-03-08T04:26:00.000-08:002007-03-08T04:27:38.957-08:00Check out another news portal<a href="http://johnraymondbaker.php1h.com/mambo/">http://johnraymondbaker.php1h.com/mambo/</a>chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-1166633413574327342006-12-20T08:46:00.000-08:002006-12-20T08:50:14.043-08:00CLOSING DATES FOR CHRISTMAS<a href="http://photos1.blogger.com/x/blogger/7190/2153/1600/35693/santa.jpg"><img style="float:left; margin:0 10px 10px 0;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://photos1.blogger.com/x/blogger/7190/2153/400/732455/santa.jpg" border="0" alt="" /></a><br />BAKER CHIROPRACTIC, 1420 MCCANN ROAD, LONGVIEW TEXAS, WILL BE CLOSING AT ONE (1) PM ON FRIDAY, 22ND OF DECEMBER, AND WILL REOPEN ON WEDNESDAY, THE 27TH OD DECEMBER, 2006.<br /><br />WE APPRECIATE EACH AND EVERY ONE OF OUR PATIENTS AND WISH EVERYONE, MERRY CHRISTMAS AND HAPPY HOLIDAYS, AND WISH YOU THE VERY HAPPIEST, HEALTHIEST, AND MOST JOYOUS SEASON.<br /><br />DR. JOHN RAYMOND BAKER,DC AND STAFF OF BAKER CHIROPRACTIC, PA<br />903-753-5400chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-1166394556097638742006-12-17T14:28:00.000-08:002006-12-17T15:51:48.283-08:00TAMMY GRADUATES WITH TWO ASSOCIATE DEGREES<a href="http://www.healingtexas.com/tammygraduates.rm">http://www.healingtexas.com/tammygraduates.rm</a>chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-1166394058445788232006-12-17T14:20:00.000-08:002006-12-17T14:20:58.696-08:00<embed width="321" height="321" src="http://www.longviewdoctor.com/tammygraduates.swf">chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-1164316871576912672006-11-23T13:17:00.000-08:002006-11-23T13:21:12.120-08:00HAPPY THANKSGIVINGOUR OFFICE IS CLOSED IN HONOR OF THE HOLIDAYS THIS THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, THE 23RD AND 24TH OF NOVEMBER, BUT WE SHALL RETURN ON MONDAY.chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-1161393856576141202006-10-20T18:23:00.000-07:002006-10-20T18:24:16.866-07:00MEDICAL ERRORS...MORE=============================================================<br /><p>editor's note- Recently, as indicated here and elsewhere, in Texas, a CRAZY thing happened, well, more like, a horrible abuse of the legal system happened. The Texas Medical Association, which has no mandate to oversee any profession (The Texas Medical Board, http://www.tmb.state.tx.us/ oversees practice of medicine in Texas) , filed a lawsuit against the Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners, claiming , among other things, that Chiropractic Doctors should not be allowed legally to diagnose their own patients. The Texas Meddlesome Assn...er..uh "Texas Medical ASSn" says they did so, in order to "protect citizens of Texas".</p><p><a href="http://metasearch.com/www2search.cgi?p=%22HARVARD+MEDICAL+PRACTICE+STUDY%22&l=20&amp;s=o"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">This is ridiculous to the point of absurdity.</span></a></p><p><a href="http://metasearch.com/www2search.cgi?p=%22HARVARD+MEDICAL+PRACTICE+STUDY%22&l=20&amp;s=o"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"></span>If the Texas Meddlesome ASSn, or "Texas Medical Association" as they prefer to be called,<br />cares so much about protecting the public, perhaps they should clean up their OWN profession.<br />Please read the following article.</a></p><p><a href="http://metasearch.com/www2search.cgi?p=%22HARVARD+MEDICAL+PRACTICE+STUDY%22&l=20&amp;s=o">http://metasearch.com/</a></p>The Quality of Health Care<br /><h2>Medical Error and Patient Injury: Costly and Often Preventable </h2><br /><h3 style="margin-top: 0px;"><em>Research Report</em> </h3><br /><p class="articleAuthor">Andrew H. Smith, AARP Public Policy Institute </p><br /><p class="articlePrintDate">September 1998</p><br /><p><br /><br /></p><br /><p><b>Table of Contents:</b> </p><br /><ul><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#PUBLIC"><br />Public Perception of Patient Safety and Medical Error</a> </li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#INCIDENCE"><br />Incidence of Medical Error and Injury</a> </li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#DRUGS"><br />Drugs and Medical Injury</a> </li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#COSTS"><br />Costs Resulting from Medical Injury</a> </li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#WHY"><br />Why Do Medical Errors Happen, and How Should the Problem Be Addressed?</a><br /></li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#ADDRESSING"><br />Addressing the Problem from a Systems Approach</a> </li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#CURRENT"><br />Current Efforts to Address Medical Error From a Systems Perspective</a> </li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#CONCLUSION"><br />Conclusion</a> </li><br /><li><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTES"><br />Footnotes</a> </li><br /></ul><br /><p>Patient injuries that result from preventable medical errors are widespread<br />and costly.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE1"><sup>1</sup></a><br />One recent study found that more than one in six hospitalized patients suffered<br />medical injuries that prolonged their hospital stays.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE2"><sup>2</sup></a><br />It has been estimated that total annual costs associated with injuries resulting<br />from medical error may be as high as $200 billion, the equivalent of nearly one<br />out of every five dollars spent on health care in America.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE3"><sup>3</sup></a><br />Estimates of the frequency of medical errors and injuries and the costs<br />associated with them vary considerably, but even the most conservative estimates<br />indicate that the problem is widespread, very costly, and requires serious<br />attention.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE4"><sup>4</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>Preventable medical error and injury are of particular concern for older<br />people because there is evidence that they are injured at a substantially higher<br />rate than patients in other age groups. As<br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FIGURE1"><br />Figure 1</a> indicates, patients age 65 and older experience medical injury two<br />to four times as often as patients in age groups under the age of 45, according<br />to a landmark study published in 1991, the most recent age-specific data<br />available.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE5"><sup>5</sup></a><br />Advancing age was the only demographic characteristic -- not gender, race,<br />ethnicity, or income -- associated with a significantly increased incidence of<br />medical injury and of injury due to "negligence."<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE6"><sup>6</sup></a><br />The evidence suggests that costs associated with preventable medical error and<br />injury, both in terms of human suffering and dollars spent by the Medicare<br />program to treat injured beneficiaries, are very significant. </p><br /><p><a name="PUBLIC" id="PUBLIC"><b>Public Perception of Patient Safety and<br />Medical Error</b></a> </p><br /><p>There is a substantial amount of public concern about patient safety.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE7"><sup>7</sup></a><br />In a 1997 national survey, respondents rated the current health care system as<br />only "moderately safe" -- safer than nuclear power and food handling, but less<br />safe than airplane travel and the workplace.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE8"><sup>8</sup></a><br />(See<br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#TABLE1"><br />Table 1</a>.) Forty-two percent of those surveyed said that they had been<br />involved, either personally or through a friend or relative, in a situation<br />where a medical mistake was made. Fifty-two percent of respondents stated that<br />they were satisfied with the measures currently in place to prevent medical<br />mistakes, but a large minority, 42 percent, said they were not satisfied.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE9"><sup>9</sup></a><br />Not surprisingly, most of those who reported that they were not satisfied with<br />current measures were those who had been involved in some way with a medical<br />mistake.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE10"><sup>10</sup></a><br /></p><br /><table width="100%"><br /><tbody><tr><br /> <td align="center"><br /> <img src="http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/graphics/ib35_medical_1_1.gif" alt="HOSPITAL ADVERSE EVENT RATES BY AGE GROUPS" align="middle" border="0" height="394" width="324" /><br /> </td><br /></tr><br /></tbody></table><br /><center><br /><table border="1" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="0" width="50%"><br /><tbody><tr><br /> <td colspan="2" align="center"><b><span style="font-size:85%;">Table 1. Perceived Safety<br /> of Various Environments</span></b> </td><br /></tr><br /><tr><br /> <td align="left"><b>Environment</b> </td><br /> <td align="center"><b>Mean Scores</b> </td><br /></tr><br /><tr><br /> <td align="left">Airline travel </td><br /> <td align="center">5.2 </td><br /></tr><br /><tr><br /> <td align="left">Workplace </td><br /> <td align="center">5.2 </td><br /></tr><br /><tr><br /> <td align="left"><b>Health care</b> </td><br /> <td align="center">4.9 </td><br /></tr><br /><tr><br /> <td align="left">Food handling </td><br /> <td align="center">4.4 </td><br /></tr><br /><tr><br /> <td align="left">Nuclear power </td><br /> <td align="center">4.2 </td><br /></tr><br /><tr><br /> <td colspan="2" align="left"><span style="font-size:78%;">Scores: 7=Safe, 1=Unsafe.<br /> Source: National Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA, "Public Opinion of<br /> Patient Safety Issues." Survey conducted by Louis Harris & Associates,<br /> September 1997.</span> </td><br /></tr><br /></tbody></table><br /></center><br /><p><a name="INCIDENCE" id="INCIDENCE"><b>Incidence of Medical Error and Injury</b></a><br /></p>As noted above, recent estimates of the incidence of medical errors resulting<br /><p>in injuries<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE11"><sup>11</sup></a><br />reach as high as 17.7 percent of hospitalizations.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE12"><sup>12</sup></a><br />One important study of medical injury is the 1990 Harvard Medical Practice Study<br />(Harvard Study), a population-based study of injuries resulting from medical<br />care during hospitalizations in New York. This study found that nearly 4 percent<br />of patients suffered an injury that caused their hospital stays to be prolonged,<br />or resulted in measurable disability.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE13"><sup>13</sup></a><br />The Harvard Study, which used reviews of medical records to detect medical<br />injuries, found that almost 14 percent of those identified as having suffered<br />medical injury <i>died</i> as a result of their injuries. If the rate of deaths<br />resulting from medical error identified by the Harvard Study in New York were<br />consistent with rates in the other 49 states, that would mean that 180,000<br />Americans die annually as a result of medical injuries.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE14"><sup>14</sup></a><br />That figure would be comparable to the number of deaths that would occur if<br />three jumbo-jets crashed every two days,<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE15"><sup>15</sup></a><br />and is approximately four times the number of traffic fatalities that occur<br />annually in America.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE16"><sup>16</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>Consistent with other studies that have found that most medical injuries are<br />due to errors, the Harvard Study determined that 69 percent of the medical<br />injuries identified were due to error, and were, therefore, preventable.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE17"><sup>17</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>Studies conducted more recently indicate that medical injury may be<br />substantially more common than suggested in the Harvard Study. Using a method<br />more likely to capture incidents of medical error than the earlier study,<br />Andrews and her colleagues found that 17.7 percent of patients whose care was<br />observed experienced at least one serious adverse event per hospitalization.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE18"><sup>18</sup></a><br />The frequency of medical injuries was linked to severity of illness and length<br />of hospital stay, with the likelihood of experiencing a medical injury<br />increasing by 6 percent per day of hospitalization. One or more causes<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE19"><sup>19</sup></a><br />of medical injuries were determined in just over one half of cases in the study.<br />In 37.8 percent of cases, the adverse events were found to have been caused by<br />an individual; 15.6 percent had interactive causes; and 9.8 percent were due to<br />administrative decisions. Although 17.7 percent of patients experienced medical<br />injuries that prolonged their hospital stays, the study found that only 1.2<br />percent filed claims for compensation for their injuries. </p><br /><p><a name="DRUGS" id="DRUGS"><b>Drugs and Medical Injury</b></a> </p><br /><p>Drugs have been found to be among the most common causes of medical injury.<br />In the Harvard study, 19.4 percent of the injuries detected were related to the<br />use of drugs, while the Andrews study determined that 9.3 percent of injuries<br />were medication-related.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE20"><sup>20</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>A large percentage of adverse drug events (ADEs) have serious consequences,<br />and many of them are preventable. Bates and his colleagues found that of all<br />ADEs identified in their study, 1 percent were fatal, 12 percent<br />life-threatening, 30 percent serious, and 57 percent significant. Of ADEs that<br />were determined to have been preventable, 20 percent were life- threatening, and<br />43 percent were serious. (See<br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FIGURE2"><br />Figure 2</a>.) Overall, 28 percent of the ADEs were judged preventable, but of<br />life-threatening and serious ADEs, 42 percent were determined to have been<br />preventable.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE21"><sup>21</sup></a><br />Bates found rates of 6.5 ADEs and 5.5 potential ADEs per 100 non-obstetrical<br />admissions to tertiary-care hospitals. Classen and colleagues found that adverse<br />drug events complicated 2.43 percent of hospital admissions, adding<br />significantly to length of hospital stays and to costs.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE22"><sup>22</sup></a><br /></p><br /><table width="100%"><br /><tbody><tr><br /> <td align="center"><a name="FIGURE2" id="FIGURE2"><br /> <img src="http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/graphics/ib35_medical_1_2.gif" alt="SEVERITY OF INJURY IN PREVENTABLE ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS" align="middle" border="0" height="342" width="336" /></a><br /> </td><br /></tr><br /></tbody></table><br /><p><br /><br /><!-- back to top --></p><br /><div class="TopOfPage"><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#" class="TopOfPage"><br /><img src="http://www.aarp.org/graphics/shared/topofpage.gif" alt="go to the top of the page" border="0" height="19" width="19" />Top<br />of Page</a><br /></div><br /><p><a name="COSTS" id="COSTS"><b>Costs Resulting from Medical Injury</b></a> </p><br /><p>The costs associated with injuries resulting from medical error are quite<br />substantial. As noted above, one recent estimate placed the total costs<br />associated with medical injury at as much as $200 billion annually.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE23"><sup>23</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>Most studies that attempt to estimate costs associated with medical error<br />have focused on injuries resulting from the use or misuse of medications. In<br />their 1995 study, Johnson and Bootman estimated that costs associated with<br />drug-related illness and death that resulted primarily from patient<br />non-compliance, and inappropriate prescribing, and/or monitoring by health care<br />professionals equal $76.6 billion annually.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE24"><sup>24</sup></a><br />The costs calculated for drug-related illness and death were limited to those<br />that arose from medication use or misuse in an outpatient setting, with the<br />largest component of costs resulting from drug-related hospitalizations.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE25"><sup>25</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>The ADEs identified in the Classen study, half of which were identified as<br />preventable, added 1.91 days to the mean length of hospital stays and resulted<br />in increased costs per stay of $2,262.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE26"><sup>26</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>In a follow up to their earlier study, Bates and colleagues determined that<br />an additional 2.2 days of hospitalization were required for patients<br />experiencing an ADE, at an average added cost of $3,244. For ADEs identified as<br />preventable, patients stayed in the hospital an average of 4.6 extra days, at an<br />average additional cost of $5,857.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE27"><sup>27</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p><a name="WHY" id="WHY"><b>Why Do Medical Errors Happen, and How Should the<br />Problem Be Addressed?</b></a> </p><br /><p><b>1. Negligent and/or incompetent providers</b> </p><br /><p>As a recent survey reveals, many people believe that medical errors and<br />injuries occur because there are just too many "bad doctors" and other health<br />care professionals performing in a negligent manner.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE28"><sup>28</sup></a><br />Medical injury is viewed as primarily the result of allowing incompetent and/or<br />careless providers to continue in the practice of medicine, and of hospital<br />under-staffing and other cost-cutting practices.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE29"><sup>29</sup></a><br />It has frequently been observed that relatively few providers are sanctioned by<br />the medical profession and/or state entities charged with enforcing standards of<br />medical practice despite evidence of widespread negligence.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE30"><sup>30</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>Those who believe that medical negligence and an ineffective oversight system<br />are largely responsible for medical error and injury have responded in a number<br />of ways. For example, they promoted the development and use of a practitioner<br />databank. As a result, the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) was created.<br />The NPDB collects and releases information (to authorized entities) relating to<br />medical malpractice payments, adverse licensure actions, certain types of<br />professional review actions, and reports of Medicare and Medicaid sanctions<br />taken against physicians, dentists, and some other health care practitioners.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE31"><sup>31</sup></a><br />They have also defended the laws that govern medical malpractice actions against<br />a strong effort from the medical community to enact legal reforms that would<br />curtail malpractice litigation.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE32"><sup>32</sup></a><br /></p><br /><!-- back to top --><br /><div class="TopOfPage"><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#" class="TopOfPage"><br /><img src="http://www.aarp.org/graphics/shared/topofpage.gif" alt="go to the top of the page" border="0" height="19" width="19" />Top<br />of Page</a><br /></div><br /><p><b>2. Inevitable human error and systems failures</b> </p><br /><p>A contrasting view holds that the problem of medical error and injury results<br />primarily from systems failures. Proponents of this view acknowledge that there<br />are incompetent and impaired providers who commit errors that result in patient<br />injury, and that few physicians face disciplinary actions. However, they<br />observe, there is little evidence that negligence is the major cause of medical<br />error, or that rooting out negligent and incompetent providers would solve the<br />problem. </p><br /><p>Those who subscribe to a "systems approach" to medical error, drawing on<br />psychological and human factors research, argue that human beings, no matter how<br />careful and conscientious they are, will make mistakes.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE33"><sup>33</sup></a><br />They also note that because the practice of medicine is complex, there are a<br />great many opportunities for mistakes to occur, and that the high level of<br />complexity makes it unrealistic to depend on promoting individual perfection as<br />the method to avoid mistakes that result in patient injury. For example, in one<br />study of an intensive care unit, it was determined that patients received an<br />average of 178 "activities" each day.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE34"><sup>34</sup></a><br />The average number of errors per patient per day was 1.7, or slightly less than<br />1 percent. Thus, the unit was functioning correctly 99 percent of the time.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE35"><sup>35</sup></a><br />Leape notes, however, that even an accuracy rate of 99.9 percent may not prove<br />adequate, noting that a 99.9 percent accuracy rate would translate to: </p><br /><ul><br /><li>Two unsafe landings at O'Hare airport each day; </li><br /><li>16,000 pieces of lost mail per hour; and </li><br /><li>32,000 bank checks deducted from the wrong account every hour.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE36"><sup>36</sup></a><br /></li><br /></ul><br /><p><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html"><br /><!--RC_RIGHT--></a></p><br /><!-- back to top --><br /><div class="TopOfPage"><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#" class="TopOfPage"><br /><img src="http://www.aarp.org/graphics/shared/topofpage.gif" alt="go to the top of the page" border="0" height="19" width="19" />Top<br />of Page</a><br /></div><br /><p><a name="ADDRESSING" id="ADDRESSING"><b>Addressing the Problem from a Systems<br />Approach</b></a> </p><br /><p>One medical specialty, anesthesiology, has already made significant<br />improvements in its safety record. Mortality resulting from errors in anesthesia<br />has been reduced by 95 percent over the past 15 years.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE37"><sup>37</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>Recognizing system factors, rather than carelessness or incompetence as the<br />most important causes of medical error, anesthesiologists designed fail-safe<br />systems and developed and implemented training programs to avoid errors.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE38"><sup>38</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>The success story in anesthesiology illustrates the possibilities and<br />problems for other areas of medical practice. Errors and the resulting injuries<br />in anesthesiology, unlike those in many areas of medical practice, tend to be<br />dramatic and severe.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE39"><sup>39</sup></a><br />Information about incidents and the circumstances surrounding them were,<br />therefore, available to those attempting to understand the problems, and the<br />reasons the errors occurred were often transparent. These factors were conducive<br />to understanding the problems and developing approaches to correct them. </p><br /><p>A number of scholars believe that the most important reason that medicine has<br />failed to develop more effective ways to prevent error is that, except in the<br />case of the practice of anesthesiology, there has been little opportunity to<br />study the reasons that errors occur. Information about medical error is<br />inadequate for researchers because most errors go unreported. Unlike errors in<br />anesthesiology, which, as noted above, cannot easily be hidden, errors occurring<br />in other areas of medical practice tend to be less frequently obvious and<br />dramatic in effect. In what some call medicine's <i>culture of blame</i>, there<br />is good reason not to volunteer information that an error has occurred when it<br />might otherwise remain undiscovered. In the medical culture, error cannot be<br />accepted; physicians are taught in medical school and during residency to learn<br />and practice error-free medicine, i.e., to be <i>perfect</i>. Error is treated<br />as a moral failing,<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE40"><sup>40</sup></a><br />and it is not surprising that mistakes are driven "underground." </p><br /><p>Advocates of the systems approach argue that, for medicine to enjoy the<br />success observed in anesthesiology, it is essential to overcome the barriers to<br />full reporting of medical errors. For researchers to devise ways to prevent<br />and/or to absorb<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE41"><sup>41</sup></a><br />errors and prevent injuries, they must learn precisely how and why errors and<br />their resulting injuries take place. They must have access to detailed and<br />comprehensive information on errors, and full information can be obtained only<br />if there is full disclosure of errors. </p><br /><p><a name="CURRENT" id="CURRENT"><b>Current Efforts to Address Medical Error<br />From a Systems Perspective</b></a> </p><br /><p>A number of initiatives have been developed to study and address the problem<br />of medical error using a systems approach. Examples include: </p><br /><ul><br /><li>The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and<br />Prevention (NCC MERP), an organization of pharmacy and health care<br />professional groups, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the U.S.<br />Pharmacopoeia, and consumer organizations, among others, has developed<br />numerous recommendations to prevent medication errors. These recommendations,<br />addressed to pharmaceutical manufacturers, packagers and repackagers,<br />hospitals and hospital pharmacies, outpatient pharmacies, physicians and other<br />health care personnel, should lead to the safer use of drugs in all settings.<br /><p>Among NCC MERP's recommendations: (1) print warnings only on caps and<br />ferrules of injectables; (2) make intravenous drug names visible on both sides<br />of the container; and (3) print drug names in type that is at least as large<br />as company names and logos.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE42"><sup>42</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>The organization is also encouraging the use of its "Medication Error Index<br />for Categorizing Errors," a new indexing system that will help researchers to<br />track medication errors in a consistent, systematic manner.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE43"><sup>43</sup></a><br />Widespread use of the index should result in the efficient collection and<br />compilation of data on medication error, and thereby allow the development of<br />recommendations that could lessen the chance for patient injury.<br /></p></li><li>The National Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA (NPSF) and the National<br />Patient Safety Partnership (NPSP) constitute two major initiatives to (1)<br />study medical error and (2) develop systems-based responses to reduce the<br />incidence of medical error and absorb errors when they do occur so that the<br />errors do not reach the patient. </li><br /><li>The NPSF was founded by the American Medical Association in 1997, but is<br />now an independent foundation supported by a broad range of organizations,<br />including health care professional organizations, consumer organizations,<br />insurance companies, managed care organizations, and academicians. The NPSP<br />was founded by the U.S. Veterans Administration, and like the NPSF, has a<br />broad range of participating organizations. The NPSF and NPSP have recently<br />linked their efforts to promote research into the causes and cures for medical<br />error and injury. Among the projects they are working on together are: </li><br /><li>(1) an effort to design a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive system<br />that would promote the reporting of essential data that would allow<br />researchers to learn the nature of systems failures that lead to injury; and<br /></li><br /><li>(2) a survey of health care providers and the medical culture as it<br />relates to patient safety. </li><br /></ul><br /><!-- back to top --><br /><div class="TopOfPage"><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#" class="TopOfPage"><br /><img src="http://www.aarp.org/graphics/shared/topofpage.gif" alt="go to the top of the page" border="0" height="19" width="19" />Top<br />of Page</a><br /></div><br /><p><a name="CONCLUSION" id="CONCLUSION"><b>Conclusion</b></a> </p><br /><p>The systems approach has been successfully employed in non-health care<br />settings that are, like health care, high risk enterprises. Both the airline<br />industry's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the National Aeronautics<br />and Space Administration's (NASA) "Close-Call" reporting system were developed<br />through use of the systems approach.<a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#FOOTNOTE44"><sup>44</sup></a><br /></p><br /><p>As noted above, the success achieved in anesthesiology through the use of a<br />systems approach to improve patient safety strongly suggests that applying that<br />approach would be appropriate in other areas of medical practice. Before systems<br />changes to prevent medical error and patient injury can be devised and<br />implemented, the weaknesses in the complex systems of medical care that allow,<br />or even promote, medical errors must be identified and understood. A great deal<br />of research must be performed before the goal of substantially reducing rates of<br />preventable injury can be realized. </p><br /><p>The systems approach promises significant reductions of preventable medical<br />error and injury in the future. It cannot, however, eliminate current and future<br />needs for patient compensation when a preventable injury does occur, despite<br />systems improvements. Neither can it adequately address errors/injuries that<br />arise from provider incompetence and/or impairment. Those are matters that must<br />continue to be addressed through legal and administrative mechanisms. </p><br /><p>The work of the NPSF, NPSP, and NCC MERP, among other organizations, to<br />coordinate and support research and disseminate its results, should lead to<br />safer medical practice, fewer patient injuries, and reduced health care costs.<br />Success in preventing or absorbing medical error should prove beneficial to<br />Medicare beneficiaries, who most frequently suffer medical injuries, and could<br />save the Medicare program billions of dollars currently devoted to treating<br />preventable medical injuries. </p><br /><hr /><br /><p><b>Footnotes</b> </p><br /><p><sup>1</sup> "Medical error" may be defined as "an unintended act (either of<br />omission or commission) or one that does not achieve its intended outcomes."<br />Leape, Lucien. "Error in Medicine." <i>Journal of the American Medical<br />Association</i> 272(23):1851-57 (Dec. 21, 1994).<br /><br /><sup>2</sup><a name="FOOTNOTE2" id="FOOTNOTE2"> </a> Andrews, Lori B., Carol<br />Stocking, Thomas Krizek, et al. "An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse<br />Events in Medical Care." <i>Lancet</i> 349:309-13 (Feb. 1, 1997).<br /><br /><sup>3</sup> Perrone, J. "Designing a Safer, Smarter Health Care System: AMA<br />Foundation Looks at Ways to Prevent Mistakes," <i>American Medical News</i><br />40(40):1 (Oct. 27, 1997).<br /><br /><sup>4</sup><a name="FOOTNOTE4" id="FOOTNOTE4"> </a> Reduction of medical error<br />is listed as one of "Six National Aims" in the Report of the President's<br />Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care<br />Industry (March 1998).<br /><br /><sup>5</sup> <i>Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice<br />Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York. The Report of the Harvard<br />Medical Practice Study to the State of New York.</i> Harvard Medical Practice<br />Study, 1990, 6-23.<br /><br /><sup>6</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>7</sup> "Public Opinion of Patient Safety Issues: Research Findings,"<br />National Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA, September 1997.<br /><br /><sup>8</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>9</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>10</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>11</sup> "Medical injuries" here refer to "iatrogenic injuries," i.e.,<br />injuries or conditions resulting from treatment by physicians or surgeons.<br /><br /><sup>12</sup> Andrews, et al. (1997).<br /><br /><sup>13</sup> Harvard Medical Practice Study (1990).<br /><br /><sup>14</sup> Leape (1994).<br /><br /><sup>15</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>16</sup> There were 43,910 deaths in 1997 resulting from motor vehicle<br />accidents. National Center for Health Statistics. "Births, Marriages, Divorces,<br />and Deaths for February 1997. Monthly Vital Statistics Report." 46: 2. (1997).<br /><br /><sup>17</sup><a name="FOOTNOTE17" id="FOOTNOTE17"> </a> Leape (1994).<br /><br /><sup>18</sup> Andrews and her colleagues used a prospective, observational<br />approach that followed the care of all patients admitted over a period of time<br />to three units of a teaching hospital, as opposed to the Harvard Medical<br />Practice Study that used retrospective reviews of medical records. Andrews, et<br />al. (1997).<br /><br /><sup>19</sup> "Interactive causes" refers to "interactions between individuals,<br />or between individuals and hospital entities, or between hospital entities, such<br />as the failure of a consultant team to communicate adequately with the<br />requesting team." Andrews, et al. (1997) at p. 311.<br /><br /><sup>20</sup><a name="FOOTNOTE20" id="FOOTNOTE20"> </a> Harvard Medical Practice<br />Study (1990).<br /><br /><sup>21</sup> Bates, David W., David J. Cullen, Nan Laird, et al. "Incidence of<br />Adverse Drug Events and Potential Adverse Drug Events: Implications for<br />Prevention." <i>Journal of the American Medical Association</i> 274(1): 29-34<br />(July 5, 1995).<br /><br /><sup>22</sup> Classen,, David C., Stanley L. Pestotnik, R. Scott Evans, et. al.<br />Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients," <i>Journal of the American<br />Medical Association</i> 277(4):301-06 (Jan. 22/29, 1997).<br /><br /><sup>23</sup> Perrone (1997).<br /><br /><sup>24</sup> Johnson, Jeffrey A. and J. Lyle Bootman. "Drug-Related Morbidity<br />and Mortality: A Cost-of-Illness Model," <i>Archives of Internal Medicine</i><br />155:1949-56 (Oct. 6, 1995). This estimate includes all types of medication<br />error, both preventable and non-preventable. It does not include costs<br />associated with injuries that are the result of unforseeable<br />allergic/idiosyncratic responses or those that occur when the provider knows<br />that there are risks associated with a drug but prescribes it anyway because, in<br />his/her judgment, the potential benefits outweigh the risks.<br /><br /><sup>25</sup> When indirect costs due to non-compliance are added to the direct<br />cost figures, total economic costs rise to approximately $100 billion. Berg, J.S.,<br />J. Dischler, J.J. Raia, and N. Palmer-Shevlin, "Medication Compliance: A<br />Healthcare Problem," <i>Annals of Pharmacotherapy</i> 27(9):S3-S22 (1993).<br /><br /><sup>26</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>27</sup> Bates, David W., Nathan Spell, David J. Cullen, et al. "The Costs<br />of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients," <i>Journal of the American<br />Medical Association</i> 277(4):307-11 (Jan. 22/29, 1997).<br /><br /><sup>28</sup> See Richards, Edward P. and Katharine C. Rathbun, <i>Law and the<br />Physician: A Practical Guide.</i> Little, Brown, and Co.:New York (1996).<br /><br /><sup>29</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>30</sup> See, for example, Public Citizen, "16,638 Questionable Doctors."<br />(March 1998). It is noted that, although there have been more disciplinary<br />actions taken against physicians recently, few have been required to stop<br />practicing medicine, even for a short time. In 1996, 16,638 physicians were<br />disciplined by state boards or federal agencies. The rate of "serious<br />disciplinary actions" was 3.96 per 1,000 doctors (2,731 actions).<br /><br /><sup>31</sup> Title IV of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (P.L.<br />99-660) established the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). Regulations<br />governing the NPDB may be found at 45 CFR Part 60. The information in the NPDB<br />is available only to state licensing boards, hospitals and other health care<br />entities, professional societies, certain Federal agencies, and others as<br />specified in the law. Only hospitals are mandated by law to query the Data Bank.<br /><br /><sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, many states passed "tort reform" measures in the wake<br />of the alleged medical malpractice insurance crisis of the late 1980s. They<br />included such measures as placing caps on possible damage awards (particularly<br />on awards for "pain and suffering"), restrictions on statutes of limitations,<br />limitations of plaintiff attorneys' fees, and other measures to discourage<br />potential complainants from filing malpractice actions.<br /><br /><sup>33</sup> For a brief overview of relevant developments in cognitive<br />psychology and human factors research, see Leape, p. 1853 (1994).<br /><br /><sup>34</sup> An "activity" is defined as any interaction between health care<br />personnel and patients that presents an opportunity for an adverse patient<br />outcome.<br /><br /><sup>35</sup> Leape (1994).<br /><br /><sup>36</sup> W.E. Deming, written communication quoted in Leape (1994).<br /><br /><sup>37</sup> Orkin, P.K. "Patient Monitoring During Anesthesia as an Exercise<br />in Technology Assessment." In Saidman, L. J. and N.T. Smith, eds. Monitoring in<br />Anesthesia 3rd Ed. London, England: Butterworth Publishers, Inc. (1993).<br /><br /><sup>38</sup> See Gaba, D.M., "Human Errors in Anesthetic Mishaps," <i><br />International Anesthesiology Clinics</i> 27(3):137-47 (Fall 1989). Also see<br />Cooper, J.B., R.S. Newbower, and P.J. Kitz, "An Analysis of Major Errors and<br />Equipment Failures in Anesthesia Management: Considerations for Prevention and<br />Detection," <i>Anesthesiology</i> 60(1):34-42 (Jan. 1984).<br /><br /><sup>39</sup> Leape, p. 1856 (1994).<br /><br /><sup>40</sup> Ibid.<br /><br /><sup>41</sup> It is recognized that errors are inevitable in any human endeavor,<br />including the provision of health care. Error "absorption" refers to the notion<br />that well-designed error prevention systems will "absorb" errors, keeping them<br />from reaching the patient and causing injury.<br /><br /><sup>42</sup> See U.S.P., "Medications Errors Council Recommends Changes to<br />Medical Product Packaging and Labeling," The Standard (Sep. 16, 1997).<br /><br /><sup>43</sup> U.S.P., "Medication Errors Council Promotes Categorization Index,"<br /><i>The Standard</i> (October 1996).<br /><br /><sup>44</sup> See Helmreich, R.L. "Managing Human Error in Aviation," <i><br />Scientific American</i> 276(5):62-67 (May 1997). </p><br /><hr /><br /><p><br /><br /><!-- back to top --></p><br /><div class="TopOfPage"><br /><a href="http://www.aarp.org/research/health/carequality/Articles/aresearch-import-711-IB35.html#" class="TopOfPage"><br /><img src="http://www.aarp.org/graphics/shared/topofpage.gif" alt="go to the top of the page" border="0" height="19" width="19" />Top<br />of Page</a><br /></div><br /><p>Written by Drew Smith, AARP Public Policy Institute<br /><br />September 1998<br /><br />©1998 AARP<br /><br />May be copied only for noncommercial purposes and with attribution; permission<br />required for all other purposes.<br /><br />Public Policy Institute, AARP, 601 E Street, NW, Washington, DC 20049 </p><br /><p> </p><br /><p> </p>chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-1161316649955414062006-10-19T20:56:00.000-07:002006-10-19T20:58:20.533-07:00ABSTRACT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDYBrennan T, Leape L, Laird N, Hebert L, Localio A, Lawthers A, et al. Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N Engl J Med 1991;324:370-6.[Abstract]<br /><br />Abstract<br /><br />BACKGROUND. As part of an interdisciplinary study of medical injury and malpractice litigation, we estimated the incidence of adverse events, defined as injuries caused by medical management, and of the subgroup of such injuries that resulted from negligent or substandard care. METHODS. We reviewed 30,121 randomly selected records from 51 randomly selected acute care, nonpsychiatric hospitals in New York State in 1984. We then developed population estimates of injuries and computed rates according to the age and sex of the patients as well as the specialties of the physicians. RESULTS. Adverse events occurred in 3.7 percent of the hospitalizations (95 percent confidence interval, 3.2 to 4.2), and 27.6 percent of the adverse events were due to negligence (95 percent confidence interval, 22.5 to 32.6). Although 70.5 percent of the adverse events gave rise to disability lasting less than six months, 2.6 percent caused permanently disabling injuries and 13.6 percent led to death. The percentage of adverse events attributable to negligence increased in the categories of more severe injuries (Wald test chi 2 = 21.04, P less than 0.0001). Using weighted totals, we estimated that among the 2,671,863 patients discharged from New York hospitals in 1984 there were 98,609 adverse events and 27,179 adverse events involving negligence. Rates of adverse events rose with age (P less than 0.0001). The percentage of adverse events due to negligence was markedly higher among the elderly (P less than 0.01). There were significant differences in rates of adverse events among categories of clinical specialties (P less than 0.0001), but no differences in the percentage due to negligence. CONCLUSIONS. There is a substantial amount of injury to patients from medical management, and many injuries are the result of substandard care.chiropractichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08377602042895231753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21304969.post-1161315778083555902006-10-19T20:41:00.000-07:002006-10-19T20:42:58.866-07:00SO MANY MEDICAL ERRORS...SO LITTLE TIME<p><font face="Trebuchet MS">Since the Texas Medical Association set themselves <br />up to decide what is safe and what is not, and to pursue a course of suing the <br />Board of Chiropractic Examiners in Texas because they don't think Chiropractic <br />Doctors should be able to diagnose their patients, I thought I should look more <br />into the Medical Doctor's side of safety, since the pretext of the lawsuit by <br />the TMA was &quot;protecting the safety of Texas citizens&quot; (my interpretation of <br />their assertion).</font></p><br /><p><font face="Trebuchet MS">There are so MANY errors committed by Medical <br />doctors, that a government page is setup to classify them.</font></p><br /><table id="Table1" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /><br /> <td align="left"><font class="headText3">A</font></td><br /> <td align="right"><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#top"><br /> <font class="bodyText1">Back to Top</font></a></td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /><table id="Table64" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td>&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="Spacer8"><br /><font class="font12"><b>Active Error (or Active Failure) </b></font>– The terms <br />&quot;active&quot; and &quot;latent&quot; as applied to<br /><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#error">errors</a> were coined by <br />James Reason.(<a title="Referenceaciveerror 1" name="refaciveerror1back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refaciveerror1">1</a><a title="Referenceaciveerror 2" name="refaciveerror2back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refaciveerror2">,2</a>) <br />Active errors occur at the point of contact between a human and some aspect of a <br />larger system (eg, a human-machine interface). They are generally readily <br />apparent (eg, pushing an incorrect button, ignoring a warning light) and almost <br />always involve someone at the frontline.<br /><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#latenterror">Latent errors (or <br />latent conditions)</a>, in contrast, refer to less apparent failures of <br />organization or design that contributed to the occurrence of errors or allowed <br />them to cause harm to patients. <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Active failures are sometimes referred to as errors at the &quot;<a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#sharpend">sharp <br />end</a>,&quot; figuratively referring to a scalpel. In other words, errors at the <br />sharp end are noticed first because they are committed by the person closest to <br />the patient. This person may literally be holding a scalpel (eg, an orthopedist <br />who operates on the wrong leg) or figuratively be administering any kind of <br />therapy (eg, a nurse programming an intravenous pump) or performing any aspect <br />of care. To complete the metaphor, latent errors are those at the other end of <br />the scalpel—the &quot;<a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#bluntend">blunt <br />end</a>&quot;—referring to the many layers of the health care system that affect the <br />person &quot;holding&quot; the scalpel. <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />&nbsp;</p><br /><p class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refaciveerror1back"><br />1.</a> Reason JT. Human Error. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 1990. [<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/resource.aspx?resourceID=1592">go <br />to PSNet listing</a> ] </p><br /><p class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refaciveerror2back"><br />2.</a> Reason J. Human error: models and management. BMJ. 2000;320:768-770. [<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=10720363"><br />go to PubMed </a>] <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table3" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="Spacer8"><br /><b>Adverse Drug Event (ADE)</b> – An adverse event involving medication use.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Examples:</b><br><br />&nbsp;</p><br /><p>&nbsp;</p><br /><ul><br /> <li>anaphylaxis to penicillin </li><br /> <li>major hemorrhage from heparin </li><br /> <li>aminoglycoside-induced renal failure </li><br /> <li>agranulocytosis from chloramphenicol</li><br /></ul><br /><p>As with the more general term<br /><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#adverseevent">adverse event</a>, <br />there is no necessary relation to error or poor quality of care. In other words, <br />ADEs include expected adverse drug reactions (or &quot;side effects&quot;) defined below, <br />as well as events due to error.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Thus, a serious allergic reaction to penicillin in a patient with no prior such <br />history is an ADE, but so is the same reaction in a patient who does have a <br />known allergy history but receives penicillin due to a prescribing oversight.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Ignoring the distinction between expected medication side effects and ADEs due <br />to errors may seem misleading, but a similar distinction can be achieved with <br />the concept of preventability. All ADEs due to error are preventable, but other <br />ADEs not warranting the label<br /><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#error">error</a> may also be <br />preventable. <br><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />&nbsp;</p><br /><table id="Table4" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Adverse Drug Reaction</b> – Adverse effect produced by the use of a <br />medication in the recommended manner. These effects range from &quot;nuisance <br />effects&quot; (eg, dry mouth with anticholinergic medications) to severe reactions, <br />such as anaphylaxis to penicillin.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table5" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Adverse Event</b> – Any injury caused by medical care.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Examples:</b><br><br />&nbsp;</p><br /><ul><br /> <li>pneumothorax from central venous catheter placement </li><br /> <li>anaphylaxis to penicillin </li><br /> <li>postoperative wound infection </li><br /> <li>hospital-acquired delirium (or &quot;sun downing&quot;) in elderly patients</li><br /></ul><br /><p>Identifying something as an adverse event does not imply &quot;error,&quot; <br />&quot;negligence,&quot; or poor quality care. It simply indicates that an undesirable <br />clinical outcome resulted from some aspect of diagnosis or therapy, not an <br />underlying disease process.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Thus, pneumothorax from central venous catheter placement counts as an adverse <br />event regardless of insertion technique. Similarly, postoperative wound <br />infections count as adverse events even if the operation proceeded with optimal <br />adherence to sterile procedures, the patient received appropriate antibiotic <br />prophylaxis in the peri-operative setting, and so on. (See also<br /><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#iatrogenic">iatrogenic</a>)<br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table6" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="750"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td>&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><font class="font12"><b>Anchoring Error (or Bias)</b> — Refers to the common <br />cognitive trap of allowing first impressions to exert undue influence on the <br />diagnostic process. Clinicians often latch on to features of a patient's <br />presentation that suggest a specific diagnosis. Often, this initial diagnostic <br />impression will prove correct, hence the use of the phrase &quot;anchoring heuristic&quot; <br />in some contexts, as it can be a useful rule of thumb to &quot;always trust your <br />first impressions.&quot; However, in some cases, subsequent developments in the <br />patient's course will prove inconsistent with the first impression. Anchoring <br />bias refers to the tendency to hold on to the initial diagnosis, even in the <br />face of disconfirming evidence.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />1. Redelmeier DA. Improving patient care. The cognitive psychology of missed <br />diagnoses. Ann Intern Med. 2005;142:115-120.<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=15657159" target="_blank"><br />[go to PubMed]</a><br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />2. Croskerry P. Cognitive forcing strategies in clinical decisionmaking. Ann <br />Emerg Med. 2003;41:110-120.<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12514691" target="_blank"><br />[go to PubMed]</a><br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />3. Croskerry P. The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies <br />to minimize them. Acad Med. 2003;78:775-780.<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12915363" target="_blank"><br />[go to PubMed]</a> <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table7" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>APACHE</b> –The Acute Physiologic and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) <br />scoring system has been widely used in the United States. APACHE II is the most <br />widely studied version of this instrument (a more recent version, APACHE III, is <br />proprietary, whereas APACHE II is publicly available); it derives a severity <br />score from such factors as underlying disease and chronic health status.(<a title="Reference apache1" name="refapache1back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refapache1">1</a>,<a title="Reference apache2" name="refapache2back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refapache2">2</a>) <br />Other points are added for 12 physiologic variables (ie, hematocrit, creatinine, <br />Glasgow Coma Score, mean arterial pressure) measured within 24 hours of <br />admission to the ICU. The APACHE II score has been validated in several studies <br />involving tens of thousands of ICU patients. <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refapache1back"><br />1.</a> Knaus WA, Draper EA, Wagner DP, Zimmerman JE. APACHE II: a severity of <br />disease classification system. Crit Care Med. 1985;13:818-29.[<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=3928249" target="new"><br />go to PubMed</a> ] <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refapache2back"><br />2.</a> Knaus WA, Wagner DP, Zimmerman JE, Draper EA. Variations in mortality and <br />length of stay in intensive care units. Ann Intern Med. 1993;118:753-61.[<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=8470850" target="new"><br />go to PubMed</a> ]<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table8" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Authority Gradient</b> – Refers to the balance of decision-making power or <br />the steepness of command hierarchy in a given situation. Members of a crew or <br />organization with a domineering, overbearing, or dictatorial team leader <br />experience a steep authority gradient. Expressing concerns, questioning, or even <br />simply clarifying instructions would require considerable determination on the <br />part of team members who perceive their input as devalued or frankly unwelcome.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Most teams require some degree of authority gradient; otherwise roles are <br />blurred and decisions cannot be made in a timely fashion. However, effective <br />team leaders consciously establish a command hierarchy appropriate to the <br />training and experience of team members.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Authority gradients may occur even when the notion of a team is less well <br />defined. For instance, a pharmacist calling a physician to clarify an order may <br />encounter a steep authority gradient, based on the tone of the physician's voice <br />or a lack of openness to input from the pharmacist. A confident, experienced <br />pharmacist may nonetheless continue to raise legitimate concerns about an order, <br />but other pharmacists might not.<br><br /><br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table8" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="750"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td>&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Availability Bias (or Heuristic)</b> — Refers to the tendency to assume, when <br />judging probabilities or predicting outcomes, that the first possibility that <br />comes to mind (ie, the most cognitively &quot;available&quot; possibility) is also the <br />most likely possibility. For instance, suppose a patient presents with <br />intermittent episodes of very high blood pressure. Because episodic hypertension <br />resembles textbook descriptions of pheochromocytoma, a memorable but uncommon <br />endocrinologic tumor, this diagnosis may immediately come to mind. A clinician <br />who infers from this immediate association that pheochromocytoma is the most <br />likely diagnosis would be exhibiting availability bias. In addition to <br />resemblance to classic descriptions of disease, personal experience can also <br />trigger availability bias, as when the diagnosis underlying a recent patient's <br />presentation immediately comes to mind when any subsequent patient presents with <br />similar symptoms. Particularly memorable cases may similarly exert undue <br />influence in shaping diagnostic impressions. <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />1. Redelmeier DA. Improving patient care. The cognitive psychology of missed <br />diagnoses. Ann Intern Med. 2005;142:115-120.<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=15657159" target="_blank"><br />[go to PubMed]</a> <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />2. Croskerry P. Cognitive forcing strategies in clinical decisionmaking. Ann <br />Emerg Med. 2003;41:110-120.<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12514691" target="_blank"><br />[go to PubMed]</a> <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />3. Croskerry P. The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies <br />to minimize them. Acad Med. 2003;78:775-780.<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12915363" target="_blank"><br />[go to PubMed]</a> <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />&nbsp;</p><br /><table id="Table2" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr><br /> <td align="left"><font class="headText3">B</font></td><br /> <td align="right"><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#top"><br /> <font class="bodyText1">Back to Top</font></a></td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /><table id="Table9" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="Spacer8"><br /><b>Bayesian Approach</b> – Probabilistic reasoning in which test results (not <br />just laboratory investigations, but history, physical exam, or any aspect for <br />the diagnostic process) are combined with prior beliefs about the probability of <br />a particular disease. One way of recognizing the need for a Bayesian approach is <br />to recognize the difference between the performance of a test in a population <br />vs. in an individual. At the population level, we can say that a test has a <br />sensitivity and specificity of, say, 90%—ie, 90% of patients with the condition <br />of interest have a positive result and 90% of patients without the condition <br />have a negative result. In practice, however, a clinician needs to attempt to <br />predict whether an individual patient with a positive or negative result does or <br />does not have the condition of interest. This prediction requires combining the <br />observed test result not just with the known sensitivity and specificity, but <br />also with the chance the patient could have had the disease in the first place <br />(based on demographic factors, findings on exam, or general clinical gestalt).<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table10" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Benchmark</b> – A &quot;benchmark&quot; in health care refers to an attribute or <br />achievement that serves as a standard for other providers or institutions to <br />emulate.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Benchmarks differ from other &quot;standard of care&quot; goals, in that they derive from <br />empiric data—specifically, performance or outcomes data. For example, a <br />statewide survey might produce risk-adjusted 30-day rates for death or other <br />major adverse outcomes. After adjusting for relevant clinical factors, the top <br />10% of hospitals can be identified in terms of particular outcome measures. <br />These institutions would then provide benchmark data on these outcomes. For <br />instance, one might benchmark &quot;door-to-balloon&quot; time at 90 minutes, based on the <br />observation that the top-performing hospitals all had door-to-balloon times in <br />this range.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />In the present example regarding infection control, benchmarks would typically <br />be derived from national or regional data on the rates of relevant nosocomial <br />infections. The lowest 10% of these rates might be regarded as benchmarks for <br />other institutions to emulate.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />The article below provides an excellent discussion of the principles of <br />benchmarking and the specific steps in using outcomes data to generate <br />benchmarks.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />Kiefe CI, Weissman NW, Allison JJ, et al. Identifying achievable benchmarks of <br />care: concepts and methodology. Int J Qual Health Care. 1998;10:443-47. [<br /><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=8470850" target="new"><br />go to pubmed</a> ]<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table65" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td>&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Blunt End</b> – The &quot;blunt end&quot; refers to the many layers of the health care <br />system not in direct contact with patients, but which influence the personnel <br />and equipment at the “<a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#sharpend">sharp <br />end</a>” who do contact patients. The blunt end thus consists of those who set <br />policy, manage health care institutions, design medical devices, and other <br />people and forces, which, though removed in time and space from direct patient <br />care, nonetheless affect how care is delivered. <br><br /><br><br />Thus, an error programming an intravenous pump would represent a problem at the <br />sharp end, while the institution’s decision to use multiple different types of <br />infusion pumps, making programming errors more likely, would represent a problem <br />at the blunt end. The terminology of “sharp” and “blunt” ends corresponds <br />roughly to “<a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#activefailures">active <br />failures</a>” and “<a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#latentcondition">latent <br />conditions</a>.” <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /><br class="spacer8"><br />&nbsp;</p><br /><table id="Table11" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr><br /> <td align="left"><font class="headText3">C</font></td><br /> <td align="right"><a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#top"><br /> <font class="bodyText1">Back to Top</font></a></td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /><table id="Table12" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="Spacer8"><br /><b>Checklist</b> – Algorithmic listing of actions to be performed in a given <br />clinical setting (eg, Acute Cardiac Life Support [ACLS] protocols for treating <br />cardiac arrest) to ensure that, no mater how often performed by a given <br />practitioner, no step will be forgotten. An analogy is often made to flight <br />preparation in aviation, as pilots and air-traffic controllers follow <br />pre-take-off checklists regardless of how many times they have carried out the <br />tasks involved. <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table66" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td>&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Clinical Decision Support System (CDSS) </b>– Any system designed to improve <br />clinical decision making related to diagnostic or therapeutic processes of care. <br />CDSSs thus address activities ranging from the selection of drugs (eg, the <br />optimal antibiotic choice given specific microbiologic data [<a title="Referencecdss 1" name="refcdss1back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss1">1</a>]) <br />or diagnostic tests (<a title="Referencecdss 2" name="refcdss2back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss2">2</a>) <br />to detailed support for optimal drug dosing (<a title="Referencecdss 3" name="refcdss3back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss3">3</a><a title="Referencecdss 4" name="refcdss4back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss4">,4</a>) <br />and support for resolving diagnostic dilemmas.(<a title="Referencecdss 5" name="refcdss5back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss5">5</a>)<br /><br><br /><br><br />Structured antibiotic order forms (<a title="Referencecdss 6" name="refcdss6back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss6">6</a>) <br />represent a common example of paper-based CDSSs. Although such systems are still <br />commonly encountered, many people equate CDSSs with computerized systems in <br />which software algorithms generate patient-specific recommendations by matching <br />characteristics, such as age, renal function, or allergy history, with rules in <br />a computerized knowledge base. <br><br /><br><br />The distinction between decision support and simple reminders can be unclear, <br />but usually reminder systems are included as decision support if they involve <br />patient-specific information. For instance, a generic reminder (eg, “Did you <br />obtain an allergy history?”) would not be considered decision support, but a <br />warning (eg, “This patient is allergic to codeine.”) that appears at the time of <br />entering an order for codeine would be. <br><br /><br><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p>&nbsp;</p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss1back"><br />1.</a> Evans RS, Pestotnik SL, Classen DC, et al. A computer-assisted management <br />program for antibiotics and other antiinfective agents. N Engl J Med. <br />1998;338:232-238. <br><br />[<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=9435330"><br />go to PubMed</a> ] <br class="Spacer5"><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss2back"><br />2.</a> Harpole LH, Khorasani R, Fiskio J, Kuperman GJ, Bates DW. Automated <br />evidence-based critiquing of orders for abdominal radiographs: impact on <br />utilization and appropriateness. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 1997;4:511-521. <br><br />[<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=9391938"><br />go to PubMed</a> ] <br class="Spacer5"><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss3back"><br />3.</a> Walton RT, Harvey E, Dovey S, Freemantle N. Computerised advice on drug <br />dosage to improve prescribing practice. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. <br />2001:CD002894. <br><br />[<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=11279772"><br />go to PubMed</a> ] <br class="Spacer5"><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss4back"><br />4.</a> Chertow GM, Lee J, Kuperman GJ, et al. Guided medication dosing for <br />inpatients with renal insufficiency. JAMA. 2001;286:2839-2844. <br><br />[<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=11735759"><br />go to PubMed</a> ] <br class="Spacer5"><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss5back"><br />5.</a> Friedman CP, Elstein AS, Wolf FM, et al. Enhancement of clinicians' <br />diagnostic reasoning by computer-based consultation: a multisite study of 2 <br />systems. JAMA. 1999;282:1851-1856. <br><br />[<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=10573277"><br />go to PubMed</a> ] <br class="Spacer5"><br />&nbsp;</font></p><br /><p class="font12"><font class="font12"><br /><a title="Back to Commentary" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcdss6back"><br />6.</a> Avorn J, Soumerai SB, Taylor W, Wessels MR, Janousek J, Weiner M. <br />Reduction of incorrect antibiotic dosing through a structured educational order <br />form. Arch Intern Med. 1988;148:1720-1724. <br><br />[<br /><a target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=3401094"><br />go to PubMed</a> ] <br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table13" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Close Call</b> – An event or situation that did not produce patient injury, <br />but only because of chance. This good fortune might reflect robustness of the <br />patient (eg, a patient with penicillin allergy receives penicillin, but has no <br />reaction) or a fortuitous, timely intervention (eg, a nurse happens to realize <br />that a physician wrote an order in the wrong chart). Such events have also been <br />termed &quot;<a href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#nearmiss">near miss</a>&quot; <br />incidents.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table14" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td class="Spacer1">&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Competency</b> – Having the necessary knowledge or technical skill to perform <br />a given procedure within the bounds of success and failure rates deemed <br />compatible with acceptable care.<br><br /><br class="spacer8"><br /><!--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------><br /></p><br /><table id="Table83" bgcolor="#cccccc" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><br /> <tr height="1"><br /> <td>&nbsp;</td><br /> </tr><br /></table><br /><p><br class="spacer8"><br /><b>Complexity Science (or Complexity Theory)</b> - Provides an approach to <br />understanding the behavior of systems that exhibit non-linear dynamics, or the <br />ways in which some adaptive systems produce novel behavior not expected from the <br />properties of their individual components. Such behaviors emerge as a result of <br />interactions between agents at a local level in the complex system and between <br />the system and its environment.(<a title="Reference complexityscience1" name="refcomplexityscience1back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcomplexityscience1">1</a>,<a title="Reference complexityscience2" name="refcomplexityscience2back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcomplexityscience2">2</a>)<br /><br><br /><br><br />At first, this may sound indistinguishable from the “systems thinking” commonly <br />encountered in the patient safety literature. Some people probably use these <br />terms loosely and occasionally interchangeably, but complexity theory differs <br />importantly from systems thinking in its emphasis of the interaction between <br />local systems and their environment (such as the larger system in which a given <br />hospital or clinic operates). It is often tempting to ignore the larger <br />environment as unchangeable and therefore outside the scope of quality <br />improvement or patient safety activities. According to complexity theory, <br />however, behavior within a hospital or clinic (eg, non-compliance with a <br />national practice guideline) can often be understood only by identifying <br />interactions between local attributes and environmental factors. <br><br /><br><br />Another key feature of complexity theory is the emphasis on achieving deep <br />understanding of a given problem prior to engaging in efforts to change <br />practice. For instance, instead of simply identifying that providers’ behavior <br />fails to comply with some target guideline and then implementing an “off the <br />shelf” means of achieving behavior change (eg, a financial incentive), <br />complexity theorists might identify what currently works well in a given <br />practice and the attitudes or structures that provide the basis for what works <br />well. This process may then reveal an important negative interaction between <br />local values and perceptions about the national guideline. A more effective <br />change strategy may then emerge in which the national guideline is adapted for <br />the local setting. The alternative approach of attempting to force behavioral <br />change may lead to no improvement or, worse, perverse collateral effects. This <br />phenomenon is certainly familiar when the complex adaptive system in question is <br />an ecosystem; complexity theorists advocate that we view health care systems <br />through a similar lens and not rush into change strategies, however plausible <br />they may seem. The two references below provide concrete examples to flesh out <br />the ideas of complexity theory and distinguish it from other major theories of <br />organizational behavior.(<a title="Reference complexityscience1" name="refcomplexityscience1back" href="http://psnet.ahrq.gov/glossary.aspx/#refcomplexi